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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AND APPELLATE AUTHORITY 
This is an appeal from a criminal convection after a 
jury trial in the Fifth Circuit Court for Salt Lake City, 
the Honorable Robert Gibson, Judge, presiding, on the 
charges of destruction of property and disturbing the peace. 
Authority for this appeal is provided in Section 78-2a-3, 
Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether defendant Griffin established that his 
Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a jitiry trial was 
violated by lack of minorities on the jury venire? 
2. Whether counsel for defendant/appellant Griffin 
violated Rule 11, of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by 
filing a brief not well grounded in fact and directly 
contrary to existing law? 
GOVERNING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT SIX 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . .." 
RULE 11, U.R.C.P. 
. . . The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by him that pe has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law br a 
good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 
cost of litigation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant Griffin was charged by information with 
violating Section 32-3-4, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, for unlawfully destroying property of Salt Lake City 
Corporation by damaging doors at the City's Water 
Department. (Record on Appeal p. 1•) 
Prior to swearing a jury the defendant's counsel raised 
an objection to exclusion of minorities from the venire 
2 
which was overruled. (Calendar-log sheet, R. 40.) 
At the conclusion of trial the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty on the destruction of property charge and on a 
charge of disturbing the peace in violation of Section 32-1-
11, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City. (R. 34 & 35.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court 
of Utah have both unequivocally and recently held that the 
Defendant Griffin's brief fails to comply with Rule 24 of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals by not citing at all 
to the record. 
2 
Of course since defendant Griffin did not designate a copy 
of the transcript it is impossible to tell from the record 
whether or not the jury contained any minority members at 
all. Matters outside the record should not be considered on 
appeal. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Salt Lake 
City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984). 
constitutional rights of defendants are not violated merely 
by the lack of any minority members on a juny venire. 
Rather, both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have required proof of invidious exclusion 
before any constitutional challenge can be raised. 
The case law is so unequivocal that defendant's brief 
constitutes a violation of Rule 11 in that it could not have 
been filed in good faith. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT GRIFFIN FAILED TO MEET THE 
BURDEN REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS 
TRIAL WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT. 
The United States Supreme Court has twice set out the 
standard for determining whether a particular groupT s 
absence on a jury venire denies a criminal defendant his 
Sixth Amendment rights. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 
522, 538, 42 L.Ed.2d 690, 95 S.Ct. 692 (19751) the United 
States Supreme Court held that: 
[P]etit juries must be drawn from a source 
fairly representative of the community . . . 
[J]ury wheels, pools of names, panels, or 
venires from which juries are drawn must not 
systematically exclude distinctive groups in 
the community and thereby fail to be 
reasonably representative thereof. 
The Court in Taylor further explained that this 
requirement of a fair pool does not mean "that petit juries 
actually chosen must mirror the community," Taylor, supra 
at 538. 
In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 58 L.Ed.2d 
579, 99 S.Ct. 664 (1979) the United States Supreme Court 
explicitly set out a three part test to determine whether or 
not a particular venire selection process violated the 
defendant's constitutional rights: 
In order to establish a prima facie violation 
of the fair-cross-section requirement, the 
defendant must show (1) that the group 
alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" 
group in the community; (2) that the 
representation of this group in venires from 
which juries are selected is not fair and 
reasonable in relation to the number of such 
persons in the community; and (3) that this 
underrepresentation is due to systematic 
exclusion of the group in the jury selection 
process. 
With respect to the three-prong Duren test it is clear 
that defendant Griffin has totally failed to meet his burden 
in this case. With respect to the first two prongs of a 
distinctive group's underrepresentation there is simply no 
evidence before this Court to establish that the two tests 
have been met. With respect to the third prong regarding 
exclusion, there is not even a claim in defendant Griffin's 
brief that minorities were systematically excluded. 
Instead, defendant Griffin relies on a totally 
unsubstantiated allegation implying that since no minorities 
were on the panel they must have been excluded. While this 
enthymeme may make logical sense to defendant's counsel it 
certainly does not meet the Duren requirement and is totally 
unsupported by the virtually non-existent record before this 
Court. 
The Duren and Taylor tests have been explicitly 
accepted by the Utah Supreme Court, In Sta|te v. Bankhead, 
727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) the Utah Suprieme Court held: 
In any event, the sixth amendment insures 
only that a particular segment of the 
community will not be systematically excluded 
from the jury venire^ Juries actually chosen 
need not "mirror the community and reflect 
the various distinctive groups in the 
population." (Emphasis added, citations 
omitted). 
The clear language of Bankhead, Duren and Taylor is not 
weakened in any way by the recent Utah Suprieme Court Minute 
Entry in State v. Malin, Utah Supreme Court No. 86-0571 
(Minute Entry April 30, 1987). All that the minute entry in 
Malin does is to use the CourtT s rule-making power to 
provide for a new, additional source of names for jury 
venires. There is no suggestion in the Maljin Minute Entry 
that the Supreme Court intended to rule that all panels not 
chosen from a driver's license list or which fail to contain 
a minority, violate the Sixth Amendment. Such a suggestion 
is patently absurd. The Minute Entry is simply a 
prospective change with no intended or actual retroactive 
due process implication. 
Given the absolute total lack of record before this 
Court and the "quality" of the argument in defendant 
Griffin's brief it is impossible for this Ctourt to find that 
defendant Griffin's trial in any way violated his 
constitutional rights. 
_ K _ 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL VIOLATED RULE 11 IN 
FILING A BRIEF WHICH HAS ABSOLUTELY NO 
GOOD FAITH CHANCE OF PREVAILING. 
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah have ruled on the responsibility 
of criminal defense counsel for filing appellate briefs in 
cases where they know the appeal is "wholly frivolous". The 
standard procedure is set out in Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967) which was 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Clayton, 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). In essence both of these cases 
preclude defense counsel from filing "wholly frivolous" 
appeals with certain restrictions to protect the client. 
The Anders/Clayton procedures are not followed by 
defendant Griffin's counsel in this case. In light of the 
clear, unequivocal and recent case law on this subject 
provided by Taylor, Duren and Bankhead, .cited in Point I 
above it is simply not conceivable that defendant's counsel 
can be filing this brief in good faith as required by Rule 
3 
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the City 
is entitled to sanctions, in an amount to be determined by 
the Court, against defendant's counsel personally for the 
time and expense involved in responding to defendant's 
brief. 
3 
Defendant Griffin's brief also fails to comply with Rule 
24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals as noted in 
footnote 1, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Griffin's appeal is directly contrary to 
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah and must be dismissed. 
Further, the brief is in such bad faith that defendant's 
counsel should be personally sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this"2^(_ d^y of November, 1987. /* 
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